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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a scal common pool problem
in Japanese municipal mergers. Specically, we investigated whether
the merged municipalities rapidly their increase expenditures and bond
just before mergers. Because the likelihood of Japanese municipal
mergers depends on a municipality's characteristics such as population
size, area, and scal conditions, municipal mergers are a non-voluntary
and non-random phenomenon in Japan. Therefore, identify causal
eects by applying propensity score matching within a dierences-
in-dierences framework to address the problems of endogeneity bias
and sample selection bias. In particular, we focus on the subordinate
merger partner in absorption-type merger. Our results show that the
subordinate merger partner suers from adverse scal conditions and
creates the scal common pool problem in public projects just before
mergers.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Do municipal mergers create a scal common pool problem? Recently, nu-
merous studies have attempted to resolve this question in local public -
nance. The scal common pool problem in scal policy is related to the free
rider problem, pork-barrel spending, and the law of 1=n{ which are all very
similar phenomena. For example, consider the situation in which only some
municipalities receive most of the marginal benets from a public project
while the marginal costs of the project are paid by the new municipality af-
ter a merger. Municipal mergers give a municipal government the incentive
to increase bond and expenditures before mergers because the people in the
new municipality will share the cost.
Previous studies have identied the scal common pool problem in mu-
nicipal mergers in countries such as Canada, Denmark, Germany, Israel,
Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan (e.g., Baqir, 2002; Bradbury and
Stephenson, 2003; Hinnerich, 2009; Blom-Hansen, 2010; Jordahl and Liang,
2010; Hansen, 2014; Hirota and Yunoue, 2014a, b; Flitz and Feld, 2015;
Nakazawa, 2015; Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2015)1. Most of these studies ex-
amined voluntary municipal mergers and reported a positive eect on bond
after municipal mergers using the dierences-in-dierences (DID) method.
Few studies have examined the scal eect of bond just before mergers using
the DID method. For instance, Hinnerich (2009), Jordahl and Liang (2010)
and Nakazawa (2015) found that the merged municipalities increased bond
just before mergers because they can share the additional nancial burden
after mergers using the DID method.
To evaluate the scal common pool problem in Japan, this paper focuses
on municipal governmental expenditures and bond just before mergers using
quasi-experimental evidence. Since Japan's municipal mergers have some
tendencies, it is inadequate to apply the DID method to Japanese municipal
mergers as was done in previous studies.
For example, aside from the evaluation of the scal common pool prob-
lem, Kauder (2014) applied the propensity score matching (PSM) method to
address the sample selection bais between the treatment and control groups
on the German municipal mergers. Kauder (2014) studied the dierence
of inuence between large municipalities and small municipalities. The re-
sults showed the merger's eects of the population of the small mergerd
municipalities is larger than small non-merged municiplities while there are
no dierences between large merged municipalities and large non-merged
municiplities.
We are skeptical that municipal mergers are truly voluntary and ran-
dom because local public nance is like a centralization system in Japan.
1A related studies shows the scal eects after mergers, for example Reingewerts (2012),
Bless and Baskaran (2016).
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The Japanese central government encouraged municipalities to merge from
FY1998 to FY2005 using the Special Municipal Mergers Law of the Min-
istry of Internal Aairs and Communications (MIC)2. The Special Municipal
Mergers Law, a so-called carrot and stick policy, was temporary legislation
in force until FY20053.
As a result of this merger policy, the number of municipalities in Japan
decreased from 3,232 in FY1998 to 1,820 in FY2005. Most of these mergers
occurred in rapid succession in FY2004 and FY2005. In other words, the
central government induced municipalities to merge as a national policy.
The national movement was called "Heisei era big municipal mergers". As
the scal conditions of the central and local governments declined rapidly
following the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s, this merger policy
was intended to strengthen municipalities and decrease public expenditure.
In Japan, recent research indicates that small municipalities in poor -
nancial condition chose municipal mergers (e.g., Nishikawa, 2002; Hirota,
2007; Kawaura, 2009; Nakazawa and Miyashita, 2014; Miyazaki, 2014; Hi-
rota and Yunoue, 2014a; Hirota and Yunoue, 2014b; Weese, 2015)4. These
studies reported that the factors driving municipal mergers are poor scal
conditions, population decline, and small municipality size5. In other words,
Japanese municipal mergers are the result of a national merger policy in-
tended to address serious scal problems. Because we consider assignment
to the merged municipality group to be non-voluntary and non-random, we
cannot apply the DID method in this case. We devote attention to address-
ing sample selection bias and obtaining proper counterfactual data.
In this paper, we especially focus on the subordinate partners in merg-
ers as the treatment group to examine the heterogeneity of treatment ef-
fects. We do so because previous studies created treatment groups based on
whether the municipalities chose to merge. However, we believe that the s-
cal eects on the subordinate and dominant merger partner dier. Although
a subordinate merger partner with a small size and dicult scal conditions
may increase bond before a merger, a dominant merger partner with a large
size and sound scal condition may reduce additional bond. There are also
2MIC plays an important role in local administration and public nance as an appro-
priate authorities and decieds such as an amount of some grants to local governments
3The Japanese scal year is from April to March. The deadline of the Special Municipal
Mergers Law is 31 March, 2006
4Weingast et al. (1981) formalized the scal common pool problem. See Weingast et
al., Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Acemoglu (2003)
5Srensen (2006) examined political factors in merger decisions and the expected e-
ciency gains and found that generous grants compensated for the eect of dis-economies
of scale on municipal mergers. Because small municipalities could receive higher levels
of grants from the central government in the absence of a merger, they did not regard a
merger as necessary. In addition, although the central government promised to maintain
the level of grants to small municipalities, some small municipalities chose not to engage
in municipal mergers because of the lack of credibility of the central government.
3
two types of mergers, an absorption-type merger and an equal-type merger.
In the case of an equal-type merger, it is considerably more dicult to defect
as such mergers entail mutual surveillance.
Thus, if we were to create treatment groups following the approach of
previous studies, our results might capture eects of the dominant merger
partner and equal-type mergers. However, in reality, we could observe so
many absorption-type mergers in Japan. Therefore, we focus primarily on
the subordinate merger partner in absorption-type mergers.
We also deal with total expenditure, investment expenses and bond in
terms of the scal common pool problem. Previous studies examined only
the change of debt stock. If the merged municipalities increase investment
expenses and bond just before mergers, we can call the phenomena the scal
common pool problem on municipal mergers. This is the reason debt stock
includes interest of debt which municipalities borrowed long bofore.
In this paper, we estimate the scal eect of municipal mergers us-
ing average treatment eect on the treated (ATET) estimation based on
the propensity score matching with dierences-in-dierences (PSM-DID)
method to evaluate the causal eect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
explains Japanese intergovernmental transfers and the special law regarding
municipal mergers. Section 3 describes the empirical framework. Section 4
explains the selection of the subordinate merger partners as the treatment
group. Section 5 describes the dataset. Section 6 presents the estimation
results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Japanese intergovernmental transfers and Spe-
cial Municipal Mergers Law
In Japanese local public nance, local governments receive Local Allocation
Tax grants of approximately 16 - 20 trillion Japanese yen annually, nanced
by the central government (through the system of Local Allocation Tax
grants, abbreviated LAT grants)6. The LAT grants system means that
there is an intergovernmental transfers system in Japan. For example, the
amount of the LAT grants for FY1998 was approximately 16 trillion yen,
while the central government's general accounting budget for FY1998 was
approximately 80 trillion yen.
The LAT grants represent 30 percent of local government revenue. A
municipality can use the LAT grants as unconditional lump-sum grants.
For some municipalities, the LAT grants account for over 70 percent of total
revenue. Local tax revenue accounts for approximately 30 percent of total
revenue. Unfortunately, Japanese local public nance is sometimes described
6This section follows Hirota and Yunoue (2014a). For further information on the LAT
grants system, see Ihori (2009) and Saito and Yunoue (2009).
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as local governments having "thirty-percent autonomy" 7. Thus, the scal
condition of a local government is substantially dependent on the central
government. The LAT grants system has been in place for over 60 years.
The LAT grants system is very uncommon system from a global per-
spective. The amount of the LAT grants provided to each municipality is
determined based on the municipality's scal shortage according to the cen-
tral government. In other words, the MIC determines the amount of the
LAT grants allocated to each municipality on the basis of the scal gap.
Because the LAT grants are unconditional lump-sum grants, most munici-
palities prefer LAT grants to conditional grants. For example, the number
of municipalities that received LAT grants in FY1998 is 3114 out of a total
of 3232. Over 90 percent of municipalities receive LAT grants every year.
However, the central government's scal condition has been chronically
deteriorating since the 1990s. The long-term debt stock of the central and
local government exceeded approximately 130 percent of GDP at the end of
FY1998 and has since continued to increase8. In this context, the central
government has been promoting scal decentralization, including through
its municipal mergers policy.
The Special Municipal Mergers Law, called the carrot and stick policy,
was temporary legislation passed by the central government and in place
from FY1999 to FY2005 to improve scal conditions. The carrot and stick
policy is focused on the LAT grants, specic grants and bond.
The stick policy is for the non-merged municipalities9. The central gov-
ernment announced that if municipalities did not chose to merge, they would
receive a reduced amount of LAT and specic grants until FY2005. The stick
policy of the LAT grants is also called "the LAT grants shock". Most munic-
ipalities suered severely from the decrease in LAT grants of approximately
5.2 trillion yen over the FY1999 to FY 2005 period.
The carrot policy is for the merged municipalities. The central govern-
ment announced that if municipalities chose to merge, the merged munici-
palities would be allowed to receive the LAT grants for 10 years as they had
prior to the merger. Similarly, the merged municipalities were permitted to
issue special bond after merging. In addition, if the merged municipalities
issued this special bond after mergers, the central government promised to
repay 70 percent of the scal burden of the new public project. The carrot
policy aected not only the subordinate merger partner but also the domi-
7Typically, LAT grants, specic grants and bond jointly represent 70 percent of local
government revenue. Because tax revenue accounts for only approximately 30 percent of
the total, Japanese local governments are said to have "thirty-percent autonomy". This
shows that the local governments depend on the central government
8The long-term debt stock is expected to reach approximately 200 percent of GDP at
the end of FY2015.
9The stick policy is related to the "Triple Reform" implemented by the Koizumi Cab-
inet. For further details, see Ihori (2009), Saito and Yunoue (2009), Hirota and Yunoue
(2014a) and Weese (2015)
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nante merger partner through the LAT grants and special bond. Thus, the
dominant merger partner also had some incentives to merge.
In addition, if municipalities applied to merge under the Special Mu-
nicipal Mergers Law, the central government required the municipalities to
discuss the merger for at least one or two years. To apply under the special
law, they were not allowed to immediately change their the merger partners.
As mentioned above, the central government made a substantial eort to
encourage municipal mergers. That is, municipal mergers are not voluntary
or random phenomena.
3 Empirical framework
This paper analyzes the scal common pool problem in the context of
Japanese municipal mergers. Our identication strategy is based on the
propensity score matching method (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heck-
man et al., 1997; Abadie et al., 2004, 2008, 2012; Imbens, 2014)10.
Recent research has studied small municipalities and those with poor
nancial conditions that chose municipal mergers in Japan using a dis-
crete choice model, survival analysis and synthetic control methods (e.g.,
Nishikawa, 2002; Hirota, 2007; Kawaura, 2009; Hirota and Yunoue, 2014a,
b; Nakazawa and Miyashita, 2014). Because we consider assignment to
the merged municipality to be nonrandom, we cannot employ DID estima-
tion. For exmaple, Kauder (2014) studied the relationship between munici-
pal mergers and population growth using propensity score mathing method
in Germany to address sample selection biases. We devote attention to
sample selection bias, endogeneity bias and obtaining proper counterfactual
data.
However, by applying PSM to the problem of municipal mergers, we can
consider pseudo-randomization by creating treatment and control groups
that will be similar. Therefore, the treatment and control groups can be on
average observationally identical.
Moreover, when we use PSM in combination with the DID method, we
can eliminated time-consistent unobserved eects. We ultimately calculate
the ATET of municipal mergers using the PSM-DID method to consider
causal eects.
3.1 Propensity score matching
First, the ATET is the dierence between the outcomes of treated obser-
vations and the outcomes of the treated observations if they had not been
10In this section, we referred to Becker and Ichino (2002) and Abadie et al. (2004)
6
treated.
ATET = E(Y1   Y0jT = 1)
= E(Y1jT = 1)  E(Y0jT = 1)
(1)
In equation (1), Yi is total expenditure, investment expenses or local bond.
Y1 denotes a merged municipality and Y0 denotes a non-merged municipality.
T represents the municipal merger choice. If a municipality merged, T equals
1 and denotes a member of the treatment group. If a municipality did not
merge, T equals 0 and denotes a member of the control group. Because
we cannot actually observe E(Y0jT = 1), we calculate the ATET using
E(Y0jT = 0) as a substitute for E(Y0jT = 1). The ATET is reected in
equation (2).
ATET = E(Y1   Y0jT = 1)
= E(Y1jT = 1)  E(Y0jT = 0)
+ (E(Y0jT = 0)  E(Y0jT = 1))
(2)
If (E(Y0jT = 0)   E(Y0jT = 1)) does not equal zero, the ATET has some
bias. The ATET is based on two assumptions that must be satised for the
estimate to be unbiased. Equation (3) is the unconfoundedness assumption,
meaning that the outcomes are independent of treatment, conditional on xi.
Y0 ? T jX (3)
Equation (3) shows that the assignment to municipal merger and Y0 are
independent. The treatment variable needs to be exogenous.
Pr(T = 1jX) < 1
for all X
(4)
Equation (4) reects the common support assumption. There is a matched
control observation with similarX for each treated observation. When equa-
tion (3) and (4) exist, we calculate the ATET without some biases by re-
moving (E(Y0jT = 0)  E(Y0jT = 1)) in equation (2).
Even if observation variables are comparable to a similar group, un-
observed variables might cause sample selection biases. The curse of di-
mensionality makes it too dicult to match a large number of covariates
using cross-sectional matching methods. The PSM method can overcome
the problem or at least mitigate the problems associated with the curse of
dimensionality.
Second, the PSM method is a statistical matching method that attempts
to estimate the eect of a treatment by accounting for the covariates that
predict assignment to treatment. Regardless of whether municipalities are
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actually chose to engage in municipal mergers, the method can assign them
randomly into a control group of non-merged municipalities and a treated
group of merged municipalities using a predicted probability. This predicted
probability is based on a probit or logit model to create a counterfactual
group. Furthermore, we can be seen as randomly assigning observations to
either group to match the same or similar propensity score.
We estimate the factors aecting the municipal merger decision using
the empirical model dened in equation(5):
P (X) = Pr(T = 1jX) = E(T jX) (5)
The propensity score is a probit model with T as the outcome variable andX
as covariates. The propensity score is the conditional predicted probability
of receiving treatment given pre-treatment characteristics X.
Third, we match observations from treatment and control groups based
on their propensity scores. the PSM method matches a similar predicted
probability given equation (3). The ATET of PSM is reected by equation
(6).
ATET = E(Y1   Y0jT = 1)
= EjP (X)jT=1(E(Y1jT = 1; P (X))  E(Y0jT = 1; P (X))
= EjP (X)jT=1(E(Y1jT = 1; P (X))  E(Y0jT = 0; P (X))
(6)
We calculate a consistent estimator of the ATET using equation (7):
^ATET =
1
N1
N1X
i=1
[Y1i  
N0X
j=1
W (i; j)Y0j ] (7)
N1 indicates the size of the merged municipality sample and N0 indicates the
size of the non-merged municipality sample. W (i; j) is a weight assigned to a
non-merged municipality based on the propensity score and
P
jW (i; j) = 1.
We applied the common support assumption from Becker and Ichino
(2002). If some observations cannot be matched to a similar comparison
group, they need to be dropped from our data. Moreover, an assignment to
treatment is independent of the X characteristics given the same propensity
score. We have to verify that the samples are balanced on covariates.
3.2 Propensity score matching with dierences in dierences
In this section, we explain the ATET of the PSM-DID method. Equation
(7) showed the ATET, which can eliminate sample selection bias by match-
ing the merged municipalities with similar non-merged municipalities. It
should be noted that the ATET of the PSM might capture time-consistent
unobserved eects. If that is the case, equation (7) cannot be consistent.
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Heckman et al. (1997) introduced the PSM-DID method to consider unob-
served eects. Equation (8) describes the ATET of the PSM-DID method.
^ATET =
1
N1t
N1tX
i=1
[Y1ti  
N0tX
j=1
W (i; j)Y0tj ]
  1
N1s
N1sX
i=1
[Y1si  
N0sX
j=1
W (i; j)Y0sj ]
(8)
where t and s index the pre-treatment period and the end of the pre-
treatment period. N1t and N1s indicate the number of municipalities at
each point in time.
In this case, unconfoundedness assumption is described by the following
equation (9):
E(Y0t   Y0sjT = 1; P (X)) = E(Y0t   Y0sjT = 0; P (X)) (9)
Equation (9) shows that there is no correlation between dierences in the
outcome variable and assignment to merger status. In other words, there
is no dierence between the average value of the merged municipalities and
the average value of the non-merged municipalities.
3.3 Matching methods
Recent studies have proposed dierent matching methods: nearest neighbor
matching, radius matching, and kernel matching.
Nearest neighbor matching is described by equation (10).
minj jjPi   Pj jj (10)
For each treated observation i, select a control observation j that has the
closet X. We select merged municipalities and nd the non-merged munic-
ipalities with closest propensity score.
Radius matching is described by equation (11).
(Pj j jjPi   Pj jj < r) (11)
Each treated observation i is matched with control observation j that falls
within r.
In kernel matching, each treated observations i is matched with several
control observations, with weights inversely proportional to the distance
between the treatment and control observations. The weights are dened
as:
W (i; j) =
K(
Pj Pi
h )PN0
j=1K(
Pj Pi
h )
(12)
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h is the bandwidth parameter.
4 Subordinate merger partner as the treatment
group
In considering a probit model of Japanese municipal mergers in equation (5),
we follow the ndings of Nishikawa (2002), Hirota (2007), Kawaura (2009)
and Hirota and Yunoue (2014a). These studies reported that small and poor
municipalities chose to engage in municipal mergers.
We also apply a population criterion to identify the scal common pool
problems that lead to the decision to be a subordinate merger partner. There
are cases in which merger partners can be classied as the dominant or sub-
ordinate merger partner. If a small municipality is absorbed by a large neigh-
boring municipality as a dominant partner, the resulting merged municipal-
ity may increase the number of new public projects. These projects are
accompanied by additional investment expenses. The subordinate merger
partner will borrow more to cover its expenses, which will increase the public
bond. However, the subordinate merger partner prefers to externalize the
expenses on public projects nanced by bond while it receives most of the
marginal benets from a public project.
According to the law of 1=n, merger partners have an incentive to free
ride that depends on their population size over that of the new municipal-
ity (e.g., Hinnerich, 2009; Jordahl and Liang, 2010; Blom-Hansen, 2010;
Hansen, 2014; Nakazawa, 2015; Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2015). Speci-
cally, Hinnerich (2009) dened the 1   popi=popnew as the free-rider treat-
ment group when popi is the population size of municipality i and popnew is
the population size of the new municipality.
In this paper, the treatment group T refers to the following three patterns
of subordinate partners.
Equation (13) is called the basic model if the population size of a merger
partner is smaller than half the population size of the new municipality; in
that case, T equals 1 and zero otherwise.
TB = 1 ; if popi <
popnew
2
TB = 0 ; otherwise
(13)
where popi is the population size of a municipality and popnew is the pop-
ulation size of the new municipality. This model is similar to Hinnerich's
(2009) free-rider model.
However, the model may introduce some bias (underestimating or over-
estimating) because equation (13) includes equal-type mergers and the dom-
inant merger partners.
In addition, the dominant partner does not choose to incur additional
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bond from new public projects because it must repay this bond itself after
a merger. The subordinate merger partner may prefer reducing funding to
incurring new bond. Therefore, we focus on the subordinate merger partner
in equations (14) and (15).
Equation (14) is called the subordinate partner model (A) if the popula-
tion size of a subordinate merger partner is smaller than the population size
of the dominant merger partner; in that case, T equals 1 and zero otherwise.
TSA = 1 ; if popi < popd
TSA = 0 ; otherwise
(14)
where popd is the population size of the dominate merger partner.
Equation (15) is called the subordinate partner model (B) if the pop-
ulation size of the subordinate merger partner is smaller than half of the
population size of the dominant merger partner; in that case, T equals 1
and zero otherwise.
TSB = 1 ; if popi <
popd
2
TSB = 0 ; otherwise
(15)
These population sizes are measured from pre-merger data on each mu-
nicipality. Only popnew is measured using post-merger data.
5 Data
In the probit model, we use a Japanese municipality's data for FY1998.
This means that the Special Municipal Mergers Law is enforced for 7 years,
from FY1999 to FY2005. The rst municipal merger involved four towns in
FY1999. However, most of municipal mergers are concentrated in FY2004
and FY2005. We assume that there is a period of consultation period lasting
a few years. Therefore, we employ the data for FY1998, just before the
special law came into eect, to estimate probit model. Furthermore, we
attempt to match similar propensity scores using various matching methods.
The number of municipalities that chose to merge in FY2004 is 831.
The number of treatment observations is as follows: equation (13), 675;
equation (14), 614; and equation (15), 497. In other words, there were
many absorption-type mergers in Japan.
To estimate the predicted probability using the probit model, we use
these following covariates: population, area, share of population over 65,
share of population under 15, share of primary industry, share of tertiary
industry, share of LAT grants, share of the specic grants and share of bond
stock. The shares of LAT grants and specic grants are as a proportion
of total municipal revenue. A municipality that is nancially dependent on
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transfers may choose to merge because it suers from diculties resulting
from scal problems. The bond stock is per capita accumulated bond. We
use period t-1 for the nancial data such as LAT grants, specic grants and
bond stock.
In the PSM and PSM-DID model, we employ the pre-merger scal
data to calculate the ATET. We use expenditure and bond information
for FY2003 as outcome variables for mergers conducted in FY2004. For
example, if a subordinate merger partner engaged in a municipal merger
in FY2004, we use total expenditure, investment expenses (non-subsidized
public works expenses) and bond in FY2003 as outcome variables.
Data on municipal governments are derived primarily from the Shi Tyo
Son Kessan Card (Statistics of the Final Accounts of Municipal Govern-
ments) and the Gappei Digital Archive (Digital Archive of Municipal Merg-
ers).
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The mean of population size
is 36,635. The maximum population size is approximately 3.3 million people,
and the minimum population size is 204. The data on area also exhibit
a wide range. Regarding the share of LAT grants, many municipalities
receive them from the central government. Surprisingly, some municipalities
received considerable LAT grants that accounted for 70 percent of total
revenue, and there are few municipalities that do not depend on LAT grants.
6 Empirical results
6.1 DID results
In this section, similar to previous research, we estimate the ATET by the
DID method. A descriptive comparison of the eect of a municipal merger on
the merged municipalities is given in Fig. 1 from the basic model in equation
(13). As the gure indicates, there is a substantial dierence between the
merged and non-merged municipalities. The per capita total expenditures
of the merged municipalities equal approximately 800 thousand yen, while
the per capita total expenditures of the non-merged municipalities equal
approximately 600 thousand yen. In addition, per capita merged municipal
expenditures exhibit an increase in FY2003. Nevertheless, per capita non-
merged municipal expenditures exhibit a decreasing trend. We are also able
to observe a clear distinction between the merged and non-merged groups
beginning in FY2001.
Fig. 2 depicts the results for the subordinate merger partners. This
gure depicts a similar tendency to that in Fig. 1. In terms of the per
capita investment expenses and bond, the dierence between two groups
increased from FY2001 to FY2003. From this, we can see that the merged
municipalities implicitly increase their bond for investment expenses just
prior to mergers.
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Moreover, estimated the average dierence between the merged and non-
merged municipalities using the DID method. Table 2 presents the results
of the DID estimation. According to the basic model, it is evident that
the ndings for merged municipalities are statistically signicant and that
they increase expenditures and bond before mergers. The ATET for invest-
ment expenses equals approximately 24 thousand yen in FY2003 and that
for bond is approximately 19 thousand yen in FY2003. Thus, most nancial
resources for new public projects are obtained via new bond. As subordi-
nate merger partner models (A) and (B) show, small municipalities that are
absorbed by larger municipalities exhibit marked increases in investment ex-
penses and new bond. In subordinate merger partner model (B), investment
expenses increase by approximately 22 thousand yen and bond increases by
approximately 17 thousand yen. Thus, this might reect the scal common
pool problem.
However, note that these results are obtained using the DID method.
To employ DID estimation in this case, it is necessary to satisfy the parallel
trends assumption. When we use the DID method, both the treatment and
control groups must be very similar during the pre-treatment period. In
Figs. 1 and 2, we can see the dierent trends exhibited by the merged and
non-merged municipalities. In other words, this raises concerns of sample
selection bias. The merged municipalities may have a "propensity" that
depends on certain conditions, and hence municipalities suering from -
nancial diculties might choose to merge. In this case, we cannot obtain an
unbiased estimator using the DID method.
6.2 PS estimation results
In this section, the empirical results concern the probit estimation used to
calculate the propensity score. Table 3 reports the probit estimation results.
In the basic model, the coecients for population and area are negative
and statistically signicant. The LAT grants and bond stock coecients are
positive and signicant, while specic grants have a negative and signicant
coecient. In subordinate merger models (A) and (B), the coecients for
population and area are negative and statistically signicant. A small mu-
nicipality is more likely to choose to be a subordinate merger partner. A
small municipality facing an aging population is also likely to choose to be
subordinate merger partner. This implies that a smaller municipality, in
terms of size and area, is more likely to be a subordinate merger partner.
Moreover, small municipalities that are dependent on LAT grants are more
likely to choose to merge with larger municipalities because of the former's
poor scal conditions. The coecient of the specic grant is negative and
signicant.
The reason for this result concerns national policy. Since the collapse of
the Japanese bubble economy in FY1991, specic grants and public projects
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have been on the decline. Because municipalities can receive LAT grants due
to a scal shortage, small municipalities tend to prefer the LAT grants to
specic grants and bond for covering a scal decit.
With the considerable mergers during the Heisei period, the central gov-
ernment decided to cut LAT grants for all municipalities because it faced
a larger scal decit than those faced by local governments. However, the
merged municipalities were permitted to receive LAT grants from the central
government for 10 years just as they had before merging under the Special
Municipal Mergers Law.
Similarly, the merged municipalities are permitted to issue special bond
after mergers under the special law. If the merged municipalities use this
special bond after mergers, the central government promises to repay 70
percent of the scal burden of a new public project.
Therefore, we consider that these municipalities chose to engage in merg-
ers during the period when the special law was applicable. It should be
emphasized that, under the special law, the special bond is not authorized
before mergers. That is, before merging, municipalities were required to pay
their own bond.
Thus, we examined whether Japanese municipal mergers were more likely
depending on municipal characteristics such as population size, area, and
scal conditions. The eects of these characteristics mean that the number of
absorption-type mergers is larger than the number of equal-type mergers. In
other words, because small Japanese municipalities in poor scal condition
chose to pursue municipal mergers, we need to assume that assignment to
the merged municipality group is nonrandom. We were able to conrm
the presence of sample selection bias in the DID estimation. Therefore, we
cannot use DID estimation to calculate the ATET for Japanese municipal
mergers. The PSM method is very helpful in addressing this issue.
Fig. 3 depicts the balanced propensity scores after the PSM method
using the probit estimation results. Because we imposed the common sup-
port assumption, the score of control group indicates whether inference is
o support or on support.
Fig. 4 and Table 4 report the results of a balancing test before and after
the PSM. The results of the balancing test after matching cannot reject
the approach of matching the data on each covariate. Importantly, the
PSM reduces the bias from before to after the matching, while there is a
substantial dierence between unmatched and matched data on variables
such as population, area, share of population over 65 and share of LAT
grants.
In the basic model, the average population of control group municipal-
ities shifts from 44,103 to 8341 after matching. Both the treatment and
control groups have nearly identical population sizes after matching. The
population of matched observations is approximately 8,400. The average
area of control group municipalities shifts from 125 to 79 and the bias im-
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proved from -42 to -1.5 after matching. Similarly, comparing before and after
matching, the PSM method substantially improved the average of other co-
variates such as the LAT grants, specic grants and debt stock. This method
enabled us to reduce the substantial bias induced by the imbalance between
the treatment and control groups.
In subordinate merger models (A) and (B), matching reduces the bias
of many covariates is by approximately 40 percent. Moreover, the bias in
estimates of the share of the population over 65 and LAT grants is improved
by attenuated by 70 percent. Because some large municipalities did not need
to merge are included in the control group before matching, the results of
the DID method exhibit substantial bias.
Thus, the PSM method makes it possible to compare very similar mu-
nicipalities to one another. In other words, we were able to attenuate the
sample selection bias presented by the context of municipal mergers.
6.3 PSM results
Next, we report the results of the PSM in Table 5. The results clearly indi-
cate reduced bias compared with the DID method in Table 2. We estimated
the ATET on expenditures and bond using nearest neighbor, radius and ker-
nel matching. Most of the results for FY2003 are statistically signicant at
the 1 or 5 percent level, whereas the results for FY2002 are not statistically
signicant. Interestingly, the results are dierent from those obtained from
the DID method.
In the basic model, per capita total expenditures increase by between
58 and 67 thousand yen and per capita investment expenses increase by
approximately 27 thousand yen in FY2003 relative to non-merged munici-
palities. Per capita bond was approximately 21 thousand yen in FY2003.
This result is larger than that in the DID results.
In subordinate merger model (A), there is a dierence in the results for
per capita total expenditure. The result from the nearest neighbor matching
is not statistically signicant, while radius and kernel matching are signi-
cant. The reason is that this model included relatively large municipalities
in the treatment group that are not subordinate partners. Thus, these re-
sults may be aected by the eects of equal-type mergers. The results for
per capita investment expenses are between 22 and 27 thousand yen, while
the results for per capita bond are between 17 and 22 thousand yen. Even
in this case, the merged municipalities covered the cost of public projects
using new bond.
In subordinate merger model (B), we can clearly see that small mu-
nicipalities that chose to be a subordinate merger partner increased their
expenditures and bond for public projects. Per capita total expenditures
increase by between 70 and 80 thousand yen more than in other cases. Per
capita investment expenses are statistically signicant at the 1 percent level.
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The subordinate merger partner increases investment expenses by, on av-
erage, approximately 25 thousand yen in FY2003 when we used nearest
neighbor matching. Similarly, the results of radius and kernel matching are
positive and signicant, indicating an increase of approximately 30 thousand
yen. Comparing FY2003 to FY2002, the ATET of investment expenses in
FY2003 is larger than that in FY2002. Because subordinate merger part-
ners expected dominant merger partners to carry the nancial burden, they
increase investment expenses considerably just before mergers. Per capita
bond is positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level in FY2003.
The subordinate merger partner increases per capita bond on average by 25
thousand yen in FY2003 using nearest neighbor matching. Both radius and
kernel matching yield roughly the same ATET. Moreover, the ATET of bond
in FY2003 was large compared with the results for FY2002. The subordi-
nate merger partner also increases its bond by the end of the pre-merger
year.
6.4 PSM with DID results
In the preceding section, we obtained our results using the PSM method
that allowed us to address the sample selection bias in municipal mergers.
In attempt to identify the scal eect of municipal mergers, we also consider
time-consistent unobserved eects. For this reason, we employ the PSM-DID
method in this section.
Table 6 reports the results of the PSM-DID method. All results exhibit
substantially reduced bias compared with the previous results and are sta-
tistically signicant at the 1 percent level. After considering both sample
selection bias and time-consistent unobserved eects, the amount of total
expenditure, investment expenses and bond increases rapidly by the end of
pre-merger year. In particular, we are able to attenuate the bias in subor-
dinate merger models (A) and (B) relative to the DID and PSM methods.
In the basic model, per capita total expenditures increase by between
43 and 48 thousand yen and per capita investment expenses increase by
between 24 and 29 thousand yen in FY2003. Moreover, per capita bond is
between 15 and 16 thousand yen in FY2003. These results lower than the
corresponding PSM results.
In subordinate merger model (A), we were are able to attenuate bias
relative to the results in Table 2 and 5. Per capita total expenditures are
between 43 and 48 thousand yen in FY2003. Similarly, per capita investment
expenses increase by between 24 and 29 thousand yen in FY2003. However,
the per capita bond is between 12 and 17 thousand yen.
In subordinate merger model (B), we are able to identify a scal com-
mon pool problem involving the smaller subordinate merger partner. The
smaller subordinate merger partners rapidly increase their per capita total
expenditures by between 44 and 47 thousand yen. Simultaneously, they in-
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crease investment expenses by approximately 24 thousand yen in FY2003
and slightly increase them by approximately 12 thousand yen in FY2002.
Most investment expenses are covered by new bond because the per capita
bond increases by between 15 and 19 thousand yet.
This is why the central government required a consultation period of
one or two years as a condition for applying for the Special Municipal Merg-
ers Law. The subordinate merger partners, which have a higher merger
probability, began to plan their new public projects two years prior to their
mergers.
An important point is that the merged municipalities create a scal
common pool problem just before mergers and then depend on the dominant
merger partner.
6.5 Robustness checks
To check of the robustness of our results, Table 7 reports results using
placebo treatment periods. We calculated the ATET for the pre-treatment
years. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the placebo ATET is zero,
then there are no average dierences between the merged and non-merged
municipalities in pre-merged years.
As mentioned above, the merged municipalities decided to merge at least
one or two years prior to the merger, and we cannot expect to observe a scal
common pool eect over the 3 years prior to the merger. Municipalities
might not increase their expenditures and bond in the pre-merger years
because they had not yet selected their merger partners. Thus, we calculated
the data for FY2000 and FY2001 in Table 7.
No results in Table 7 are statistically signicant. There are no dierences
between the merged and non-merged municipalities in this period. Thus,
the merged municipalities began to increase new public projects and bond
immediately after beginning the merger consultation.
Moreover, Tables A.1 - A.4 report results for mergers in the year 2005.
These results exhibit the same tendency as for mergers in the year 2004.
In particular, as indicated in Table A.4, the merged municipalities increase
their expenditures and bond just before mergers. One reason for this is
that most of the merged municipalities in FY2005 selected merger partners
before the deadline specied in the special law. Because the mergers needed
to have been successfully completed by the end of FY2005, they increased
expenditures and bond only one year prior.
We also checked the dominant partner model in Tables B.1 -B.3. We set
if the population size of the dominant merger partner is the largest in the
merged municiplities, T equals 1 and zero otherwise. Table B.1 shows the
results of probit estimation in the dominat partner model. In the dominant
partner model, the coecients for LAT grants and debt stock are negative,
while specic grants is positive and statstically signicant. The result was
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contrary to the results of the subordinate partner model. The dominant
partner has low dependence on the LAT grants as an unconditional grants.
But they are dependent on specic grants and facing an aging population.
Their specic grants would has been redueced by stick policy of Special
Municipal Mergers Law after mergers if they had not choosen to merge.
Therefore, they chose to be a dominant partner because they expected to
receive more grants after mergers. Table B.2 shows the result of a balanc-
ing test before and after the PSM. We succeeded to match with each same
propensity score. Table B.3 report the results of the PSM-DID methiod in
the dominant partner model. What should be noted is that there are no
dierencese between the dominant partner and the non-merged municipali-
ties. In other words, only the subordinate merger partner rapidly increase
thier investment expenses and bond just before mergers. The results show
the scal common pool problem on Japanese municipal mergers.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyzed the scal common pool problem in Japan's mu-
nicipal mergers in the context of a national policy, the Special Municipal
Mergers Law. Considering the heterogeneity of the treatment eects, we
mainly focued on expenditures and bond of the subordinate merger partner
just before mergers.
First, we found that Japanese municipal mergers have a certain likeli-
hood depending on municipal characteristics such as population size, area,
and scal conditions using a probit model. In particular, small municipali-
ties that are dependent on the LAT grants are more likely to choose to merge
with larger municipalities under the Special Municipal Mergers Law because
of the their poor scal conditions. The subordinate merger partner was wor-
ried the stick policy, which they would have been greatly reduced the LAT
grants by the central government if they had not chosen to merge during
the period. Thus, Japanese municipal mergers are non-voluntary and non-
random. In other words, the central government induced municipal mergers.
Japanese municipal mergers are "not" randomly assigned.
Second, we revealed a scal common pool problem consistent with the
law of 1=n using the PSM-DID method. Especially, we found the dierence
of scal eects between the subordinate and the dominant merger partner.
Based on the results for investment expenses and local bond, we observed
scal common pool eects in Japanese municipal mergers. Because the sub-
ordinate merger partner faced severe scal conditions, it elected to merge
with a dominant merger partner. Subordinate merger partners increased
their investment expenses and local bond in an eort to oset their addi-
tional costs by shifting the burden to the dominant merger partner. On
the contrary, the dominant merger partner didn't increase their investment
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expenses and bond. The scal common pool problem in Japanese municipal
mergers is mainly due to the subordinate merger partner. That is to say, the
dominant merger partner didn't lead to additional scal burden just before
mergers because they would be most likely to pay their own burden.
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pop. 3220 36635.32 122303.90 204.00 3351612.00
Area 3220 115.15 135.83 1.27 1408.10
Pop. 65 3220 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.49
Pop. 15 3220 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.25
Primary ind 3220 16.82 11.94 0.10 79.40
Ttertiary ind 3220 49.51 10.87 19.70 88.80
LAT grants 3220 0.30 0.13 0.00 0.70
Specic grants 3220 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.42
Debt (stock) 3220 672.32 543.27 59.04 5534.37
Total expenditure 2004 (per capita) 2256 567.69 368.11 220.04 3800.06
Total expenditure 2003 (per captia) 3077 614.26 416.40 196.15 4924.69
Total expenditure 2002 (per captia) 3188 619.13 425.70 219.21 6355.17
Investment expenses 2004 (per capita) 2256 65.82 75.62 0.47 1043.36
Investment expenses 2003 (per capita) 3077 81.32 92.09 1.43 1101.35
Investment expenses 2002 (per capita) 3182 87.29 99.67 2.75 1955.18
Bond 2004 (per capita) 2250 68.64 63.79 0.60 954.03
Bond 2003 (per capita) 3072 92.91 83.75 0.47 1289.11
Bond 2002 (per capita) 3188 83.29 89.74 0.00 1762.94
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Figure 1: Basic model.
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Figure 2: Subordinate merger model.
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Table 2: Results of DID estimation.
Total expenditure Investment Bond
2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002
Basic model
ATET 42.318*** 5.396 23.565*** 9.462** 19.327*** 3.370
(8.031) (7.714) (4.929) (4.768) (3.972) (3.974)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3,077 3,188 3,077 3,182 3,068 3,181
R-squared 0.023 0.017 0.015 0.007 0.016 0.004
Subordinate merger (A)
ATET 33.432*** -4.964 20.817*** 6.629 17.675*** 1.748
(8.415) (8.158) (5.125) (4.964) (4.276) (4.337)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3,077 3,188 3,077 3,182 3,068 3,181
R-squared 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.006 0.017 0.001
Subordinate merger (B)
ATET 35.055*** 4.542 22.054*** 9.798* 17.244*** 5.606
(9.562) (9.440) (5.996) (5.798) (4.802) (4.912)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3,077 3,188 3,077 3,182 3,068 3,181
R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.013 0.01 0.018 0.005
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The
per capita total expenditure, investment expenses and debt are thousands
of Japanese yen.
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Table 3: Results of propensity score using probit model.
Variables Basic model (T=675) Subordinate merger (A) (T=614) Subordinate merger (B) (T=497)
Pop. -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Area -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pop. 65 2.367*** 0.651
(0.799) (0.866)
Pop.15 -1.662 -4.956***
(1.733) (1.866)
Primary ind -0.007** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.004)
Ttertiary ind -0.017*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.005)
LAT grants 0.964*** 0.747** 0.759**
(0.340) (0.349) (0.385)
Specic grants -1.699** -2.465*** -1.698*
(0.864) (0.893) (0.980)
Debt (stock) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.485* -0.519 1.126**
(0.263) (0.398) (0.528)
Obs 3220 3220 3220
Log likelihood -1392.8679 -1296.2931 -1143.1596
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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Figure 3: Balanced propensity score.
Notes: U shows the unmatched data, and M shows the matched data. O
shows the o-support data, and On shows the on-support data.
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erences bias across covariates.
Notes: U shows the unmatched data, and M shows the matched data.
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Table 4: Results of balancing test.
Variables Treated Control bias t
Basic model
Pop. U 8481 44103 -36.80 -6.77***
M 8493 8341 0.20 0.38
Area U 77.53 125.13 -41.90 -8.18***
M 77.62 79.38 -1.50 -0.46
Primary ind U 20.81 15.76 43.50 9.93***
M 20.82 21.06 -2.00 -0.36
Ttertiary ind U 44.75 50.77 -61.40 -13.12***
M 44.73 44.35 3.90 0.85
LAT grants U 0.36 0.28 69.60 14.52***
M 0.36 0.37 -1.90 -0.44
Specic grants U 0.07 0.08 -31.70 -6.98***
M 0.07 0.07 0.40 0.07
Debt (stock) U 839.72 627.92 37.40 9.12***
M 832.75 796.95 6.30 1.13
Subordinate merger (A)
Pop. U 7769 43437 -37.30 -6.54***
M 7769 7598 0.20 0.46
Area U 76.82 124.18 -41.90 -7.85***
M 76.82 77.50 -0.60 -0.18
Pop. 65 U 0.24 0.20 72.10 16.02***
M 0.24 0.24 1.40 0.25
Pop.15 U 0.16 0.16 -34.00 -7.63***
M 0.16 0.16 -7.30 -1.20
LAT grants U 0.37 0.28 73.80 14.73***
M 0.37 0.37 -1.50 -0.32
Specic grants U 0.07 0.08 -31.90 -6.81***
M 0.07 0.07 -0.20 -0.04
Debt (stock) U 871.04 625.49 42.80 10.24***
M 871.04 877.81 -1.20 -0.18
Subordinate merger (B)
Pop. U 7349 41981 -37.000 -5.83***
M 7349 7289 0.10 0.15
Area U 77.33 122.06 -40.00 -6.8***
M 77.33 79.23 -1.70 -0.44
Pop. 65 U 0.25 0.20 72.50 14.79***
M 0.25 0.25 -3.10 -0.48
Pop.15 U 0.15 0.16 -38.10 -7.91***
M 0.15 0.15 6.40 0.95
Primary ind U 21.70 15.93 49.50 10.06***
M 21.70 21.15 4.60 0.74
Ttertiary ind U 43.99 50.52 -66.90 -12.61***
M 43.99 44.64 -6.70 -1.21
LAT grants U 0.37 0.29 75.20 13.59***
M 0.37 0.38 -2.10 -0.39
Specic grants U 0.07 0.08 -32.60 -6.37***
M 0.07 0.07 6.80 1.15
Debt (stock) U 904.84 629.88 46.40 10.55***
M 904.84 895.05 1.70 0.23
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. U shows the unmatched data, and M shows the
matched data after propensity score matching.
29
Table 5: Results of PSM.
Total expenditure Investment Bond
2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002
Basic model
Nearest Neighbor Matching 58.182** -8.490 31.211*** 6.368 21.276*** -0.469
( 28.253 ) ( 30.880 ) ( 6.356 ) ( 8.009 ) ( 5.822 ) ( 7.307 )
On support: Treated 674 674 674 672 674 674
On support: Control 2,015 2,118 2,015 2,114 2,006 2,111
Radius Matching 62.066*** 21.810 27.329*** 11.287** 19.831*** 6.923
( 22.246 ) ( 22.468 ) ( 5.222 ) ( 5.758 ) ( 4.504 ) ( 4.825 )
On support: Treated 673 673 673 671 673 673
On support: Control 2,010 2,113 2,010 2,109 2,001 2,106
Kernel Matching 67.420*** 26.439 26.923*** 11.597** 21.090*** 8.165*
( 22.075 ) ( 22.255 ) ( 5.192 ) ( 5.715 ) ( 4.472 ) ( 4.772 )
On support: Treated 674 674 674 672 674 674
On support: Control 2015 2118 2015 2114 2006 2111
Subordinate merger (A)
Nearest Neighbor Matching 34.761 -13.565 25.567*** 9.812 19.678*** 5.837
( 31.750 ) ( 33.685 ) ( 7.297 ) ( 8.426 ) ( 5.806 ) ( 7.531 )
On support: Treated 614 614 614 612 614 614
On support: Control 2,039 2,142 2,039 2,138 2,030 2,135
Radius Matching 72.719*** 32.468 27.453*** 11.736* 22.277*** 9.354*
( 23.506 ) ( 23.691 ) ( 5.482 ) ( 6.091 ) ( 4.751 ) ( 5.058 )
On support: Treated 614 614 614 612 614 614
On support: Control 2,039 2,142 2,039 2,138 2,030 2,135
Kernel Matching 47.135** 10.168 22.225*** 7.108 17.851*** 5.460
( 23.828 ) ( 23.959 ) ( 5.546 ) ( 6.144 ) ( 4.814 ) ( 5.116 )
On support: Treated 614 614 614 612 614 614
On support: Control 2,039 2,142 2,039 2,138 2,030 2,135
Subordinate merger (B)
Nearest Neighbor Matching 80.538** 45.414 25.752*** 8.902 25.124*** 16.737**
( 36.924 ) ( 35.790 ) ( 9.232 ) ( 9.985 ) ( 7.680 ) ( 7.653 )
On support: Treated 497 497 497 495 497 497
On support: Control 2,190 2,293 2,190 2,290 2,181 2,286
Radius Matching 69.323** 33.343 30.360*** 16.588** 21.268*** 12.105**
( 27.077 ) ( 27.520 ) ( 6.453 ) ( 7.266 ) ( 5.471 ) ( 5.945 )
On support: Treated 493 493 493 491 493 493
On support: Control 2,189 2,291 2,189 2,288 2,180 2,284
Kernel Matching 75.617*** 32.570 30.777*** 14.997** 21.864*** 12.598**
( 26.816 ) ( 27.272 ) ( 6.393 ) ( 7.191 ) ( 5.408 ) ( 5.871 )
On support: Treated 495 496 495 494 495 496
On support: Control 2,190 2,293 2,190 2,290 2,181 2,286
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The r
for the radius matching is 0.01, and the bandwidth for the kernel matching
is 0.06.
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Table 6: Results of PSM with DID.
Total expenditure Investment Bond
2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002
Basic model
Nearest Neighbor Matching 42.921*** -13.597 29.490*** 5.203 16.000*** -6.289
( 11.142 ) ( 13.320 ) ( 6.582 ) ( 6.934 ) ( 7.302 ) ( 6.673 )
On support: Treated 674 674 674 672 674 674
On support: Control 2,015 2,118 2,015 2,114 2,006 2,111
Radius Matching 47.508*** 8.723 25.885*** 10.460** 15.475*** 2.250
( 8.618 ) ( 8.296 ) ( 5.249 ) ( 5.104 ) ( 4.342 ) ( 4.301 )
On support: Treated 673 673 673 671 673 673
On support: Control 2,010 2,113 2,010 2,109 2,001 2,106
Kernel Matching 46.875*** 7.460 24.171*** 9.398* 15.149*** 1.983
( 8.534 ) ( 8.185 ) ( 5.210 ) ( 5.056 ) ( 4.307 ) ( 4.253 )
On support: Treated 674 674 674 672 674 674
On support: Control 2,015 2,118 2,015 2,114 2,006 2,111
Subordinate merger (A)
Nearest Neighbor Matching 48.070*** -0.524 29.979*** 12.267 17.880*** 4.099
( 12.351 ) ( 15.509 ) ( 7.480 ) ( 8.515 ) ( 6.074 ) ( 7.367 )
On support: Treated 614 614 614 612 614 614
On support: Control 2,039 2,142 2,039 2,138 2,030 2,135
Radius Matching 43.084*** 4.580 24.410*** 9.562* 14.012*** 0.628
( 9.062 ) ( 8.675 ) ( 5.518 ) ( 5.365 ) ( 4.597 ) ( 4.524 )
On support: Treated 614 614 614 612 614 614
On support: Control 2,039 2,142 2,039 2,138 2,030 2,135
Kernel Matching 43.345*** 4.525 24.588*** 9.763* 12.669*** -0.295
( 9.185 ) ( 8.793 ) ( 5.583 ) ( 5.056 ) ( 4.649 ) ( 4.572 )
On support: Treated 614 614 614 612 614 614
On support: Control 2,039 2,142 2,039 2,138 2,030 2,135
Subordinate merger (B)
Nearest Neighbor Matching 47.467*** 11.350 24.733*** 12.768 19.366*** 7.085
( 14.058 ) ( 13.978 ) ( 8.566 ) ( 7.987 ) ( 7.302 ) ( 6.938 )
On support: Treated 497 497 497 495 497 497
On support: Control 2,190 2,293 2,190 2,290 2,181 2,286
Radius Matching 46.613*** 12.953 24.975*** 12.500** 15.175*** 5.427
( 10.366 ) ( 10.020 ) ( 6.482 ) ( 6.329 ) ( 5.310 ) ( 5.245 )
On support: Treated 493 493 493 491 93 493
On support: Control 2,189 2,291 2,189 2,288 2,180 2,284
Kernel Matching 44.123*** 15.749 24.960*** 13.759** 15.107*** 6.272
( 10.301 ) ( 9.892 ) ( 6.410 ) ( 6.254 ) ( 5.261 ) ( 5.185 )
On support: Treated 495 496 495 494 495 496
On support: Control 2,190 2,293 2,190 2,290 2,181 2,286
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The r
for the radius matching is 0.01, and the bandwidth for the kernel matching
is 0.06.
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Table 7: Results of placebo treatments.
Total expenditure Investment Bond
2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000
Basic model
Nearest Neighbor Matching -13.721 -7.975 2.304 -7.309 -6.887 -5.345
( 11.670 ) ( 10.487 ) ( 6.377 ) ( 6.536 ) ( 5.829 ) ( 5.342 )
On support: Treated 674 674 674 674 674 674
On support: Control 2,132 2,136 2,132 2,136 2,122 2,126
Radius Matching 2.496 -0.627 4.076 -2.738 0.501 -0.540
( 8.170 ) ( 7.505 ) ( 4.723 ) ( 4.548 ) ( 4.236 ) ( 3.948 )
On support: Treated 673 673 673 673 673 673
On support: Control 2,127 2,131 2,127 2,131 2,117 2,121
Kernel Matching 2.865 -1.809 3.931 -3.628 0.475 -1.129
( 8.072 ) ( 7.412 ) ( 4.667 ) ( 4.510 ) ( 4.195 ) ( 3.909 )
On support: Treated 674 674 674 674 674 674
On support: Control 2,132 2,136 2,132 2,136 2,122 2,126
Subordinate merger (A)
Nearest Neighbor Matching -6.667 -12.634 11.850 0.814 3.972 0.708
( 13.197 ) ( 12.417 ) ( 7.357 ) ( 6.254 ) ( 6.132 ) ( 5.673 )
On support: Treated 614 614 614 614 614 614
On support: Control 2,156 2,160 2,156 2,160 2,146 2,150
Radius Matching -1.750 -2.908 2.770 -3.760 -1.674 -2.112
( 8.574 ) ( 7.842 ) ( 4.923 ) ( 4.766 ) ( 4.476 ) ( 4.160 )
On support: Treated 614 614 614 614 614 614
On support: Control 2,156 2,160 2,156 2,160 2,146 2,150
Kernel Matching -3.023 -2.596 2.050 -3.091 -3.014 -1.840
( 8.666 ) ( 7.943 ) ( 4.978 ) ( 4.814 ) ( 4.513 ) ( 4.200 )
On support: Treated 614 614 614 614 614 614
On support: Control 2,156 2,160 2,156 2,160 2,146 2,150
Subordinate merger (B)
Nearest Neighbor Matching -0.070 6.052 -2.526 2.794 -3.548 5.550
( 13.911 ) ( 12.790 ) ( 8.076 ) ( 7.054 ) ( 6.923 ) ( 6.361 )
On support: Treated 497 497 497 497 497 497
On support: Control 2,307 2,311 2,307 2,311 2,297 2,301
Radius Matching 3.356 3.969 4.538 -0.284 1.850 2.478
( 9.967 ) ( 9.144 ) ( 5.782 ) ( 5.637 ) ( 5.188 ) ( 4.817 )
On support: Treated 493 493 493 493 493 493
On support: Control 2,305 2,309 2,305 2,309 2,295 2,299
Kernel Matching 6.239 4.681 4.481 -0.327 0.925 1.358
( 9.850 ) ( 9.025 ) ( 5.715 ) ( 5.568 ) ( 5.147 ) ( 4.773 )
On support: Treated 496 496 496 496 496 496
On support: Control 2,307 2,311 2,307 2,311 2,297 2,301
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The r
for the radius matching is 0.01, and the bandwidth for the kernel matching
is 0.06.
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A Additional results in merged year 2005
A.1 Dierences in Dierences
Table A.1: DID estimation in FY2005.
Total expenditure Investment Bond
2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003
Basic model
ATET 38.217*** -5.445 24.889*** 2.902 14.594*** 4.500
(7.830) (6.435) (4.090) (3.918) (3.103) (3.226)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2,256 3,077 2,256 3,077 2,247 3,068
R-squared 0.038 0.011 0.025 0.004 0.019 0.005
Subordinate merger (A)
ATET 34.241*** -5.531 24.134*** 3.691 15.070*** 6.240*
(8.034) (6.714) (4.272) (4.111) (3.286) (3.367)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2,256 3,077 2,256 3,077 2,247 3,068
R-squared 0.035 0.011 0.024 0.004 0.019 0.006
Subordinate merger (B)
ATET 25.438*** -13.027* 16.874*** -4.320 12.678*** 3.720
(9.033) (7.727) (4.831) (4.487) (3.795) (3.876)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2,256 3,077 2,256 3,077 2,247 3,068
R-squared 0.017 0.001 0.024 0.003 0.014 0.009
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The
per capita total expenditure, investment expenses and debt are in thousands
of Japanese yen.
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A.2 Propensity score using probit model
Table A.2: Propensity score using probit model in FY2005.
Variables Basic model (T=754) Subordinate merger (A) (T=696) Subordinate merger (B) (T=546)
Pop. -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pop.2 0.000***
(0.000)
Area -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Area2 0.000
(0.000)
Pop. 65 -0.462
(0.717)
Pop. 15 -0.844
(1.685)
Primary ind -0.006* -0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
Ttertiary ind -0.007** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
LAT grants 0.746** 0.737** 1.060***
(0.310) (0.320) (0.342)
Specic grants -0.875 -1.362* -2.231**
(0.786) (0.815) (0.875)
Debt (stock)
Constant -0.025 0.121 -0.464
(0.236) (0.246) (0.380)
Obs 3220 3220 3220
Log likelihood -1596.8188 -1511.0845 -1320.8029
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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A.3 Balancing test
Table A.3: Balancing test in FY2005
Variables Treated Control bias t
Basic model
Pop. U 10679 44599 -34.50 -6.72***
M 10679 10321 0.40 0.71
Area U 91.74 122.33 -24.70 -5.44***
M 91.74 96.33 -3.70 -0.94
Primary ind U 19.64 15.95 31.50 7.5***
M 19.64 19.69 -0.40 -0.08
Ttertiary ind U 46.14 50.54 -43.00 -9.89***
M 46.14 46.24 -1.00 -0.20
LAT grants U 0.35 0.28 53.70 12.05***
M 0.35 0.35 -0.90 -0.20
Specic grants U 0.07 0.08 -25.10 -5.86***
M 0.07 0.07 -3.00 -0.57
Subordinate merger (A)
Pop. U 9835 44026 -35.20 -6.57***
M 9835 9837 0.00 -0.01
Area U 93.179 121.210 -22.60 -4.84***
M 93.179 97.438 -3.40 -0.80
Area2 U 18944.000 35221.000 -18.60 -3.7***
M 18944.000 19175.000 -0.30 -0.09
Primary ind U 20.07 15.92 35.30 8.19***
M 20.07 19.75 2.70 0.53
Ttertiary ind U 45.65 50.57 -48.40 -10.77***
M 45.65 45.16 4.80 0.98
LAT grants U 0.36 0.28 58.60 12.69***
M 0.36 0.35 5.20 1.11
Specic grants U 0.07 0.08 -28.90 -6.51***
M 0.07 0.07 7.80 1.62
Subordinate merger (B)
Pop. U 9135 42250 -35.00 -5.79***
M 9150 9081 0.10 0.13
Pop.2 U 160000000 20000000000 -9.80 -1.64*
M 160000000 150000000 0.00 0.24
Area U 96.01 119.06 -18.70 -3.62***
M 96.33 104.49 -6.60 -1.34
Pop. 65 U 0.23 0.20 46.90 9.62***
M 0.23 0.23 7.10 1.23
Pop. 15 U 0.16 0.16 -15.20 -3.22***
M 0.16 0.16 -2.50 -0.36
LAT grants U 0.36 0.29 63.70 12.37***
M 0.36 0.36 -0.70 -0.14
Specic grants U 0.07 0.08 -32.20 -6.56***
M 0.07 0.07 4.70 0.82
Notes: ***, **, * indicate statistical signicance at 1, 5, 10 percent level,
respectively.
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A.4 PSM with DID
Table A.4: PSM with DID in FY2005.
Total expenditure Investment Bond
2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003
Basic model
Nearest Neighbor Matching 51.244*** 1.368 40.124*** 5.765 14.483*** 3.200
( 11.117 ) ( 10.425 ) ( 6.510 ) ( 6.453 ) ( 4.899 ) ( 5.138 )
On support: Treated 756 756 546 756 754 754
On support: Control 1,322 2,110 1,322 2,110 1,314 2,101
Radius Matching 52.345*** -2.542 31.741*** 3.425 16.649*** 1.719
( 8.367 ) ( 6.709 ) ( 4.485 ) ( 4.054 ) ( 4.242 ) ( 3.370 )
On support: Treated 756 756 546 756 754 754
On support: Control 1,322 2,110 1,322 2,110 1,314 2,101
Kernel Matching 53.597*** -4.568 33.901*** 2.799 16.049*** 0.547
( 8.648 ) ( 6.734 ) ( 4.605 ) ( 4.067 ) ( 3.597 ) ( 3.382 )
On support: Treated 756 756 546 756 754 754
On support: Control 1,322 2,110 1,322 2,110 1,314 2,101
Subordinate merger (A)
Nearest Neighbor Matching 47.414*** -9.891 35.875*** 0.402 14.936*** 4.117
( 13.790 ) ( 11.372 ) ( 7.069 ) ( 6.767 ) ( 5.437 ) ( 5.712 )
On support: Treated 696 696 696 696 694 694
On support: Control 1,384 2,172 1,384 2,172 1,377 2,165
Radius Matching 51.353*** -2.257 32.574*** 4.491 17.851*** 2.881
( 8.632 ) ( 6.994 ) ( 4.682 ) ( 4.233 ) ( 3.632 ) ( 3.511 )
On support: Treated 696 696 696 696 694 694
On support: Control 1,384 2,172 1,384 2,172 1,377 2,165
Kernel Matching 52.798*** -4.346 34.861*** 3.966 17.006*** 1.469
( 8.954 ) ( 7.033 ) ( 4.818 ) ( 4.256 ) ( 3.738 ) ( 3.528 )
On support: Treated 696 696 696 696 694 694
On support: Control 1,384 2,172 1,384 2,172 1,377 2,165
Subordinate merger (B)
Nearest Neighbor Matching 48.896*** 3.163 33.594*** 2.101 15.906*** 4.075
( 13.402 ) ( 11.545 ) ( 7.387 ) ( 6.310 ) ( 5.658 ) ( 5.444 )
On support: Treated 546 546 546 546 544 544
On support: Control 1,540 2,327 1,540 2,327 1,533 2,318
Radius Matching 38.239*** -10.366 26.067*** -2.656 12.053** -1.652
( 9.849 ) ( 7.931 ) ( 5.359 ) ( 4.592 ) ( 4.242 ) ( 4.076 )
On support: Treated 545 546 545 546 544 544
On support: Control 1528 2,311 1,528 2,311 1,521 2,302
Kernel Matching 39.786*** -9.631 25.037*** -2.684 13.568*** -.0447
( 9.600 ) ( 7.881 ) ( 5.244 ) ( 4.562 ) ( 4.164 ) ( 4.055 )
On support: Treated 546 546 546 546 544 544
On support: Control 1,540 2,327 1,540 2,327 1,533 2,318
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 per-
cent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. Standard
errors of radius and kernel matching caluclated with the bootstrap method.
We used 100 bootstrap iterations. The r for theradius matching is 0.01, and
the bandwidth for the kernel matching is 0.06.
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B Dominant merger partner model
B.1 Propensity score using probit model
Table B.1: Propensity score using probit model
Variables Merged year 2004 (T=218) Merged year 2005 (T=297)
Pop. 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Area 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Pop. 65 6.129*** 3.045***
(1.118) (0.973)
Pop. 15 7.580*** 3.727*
(2.369) (2.066)
LAT grants -1.838*** -1.494***
(0.390) (0.353)
specic grants 2.853*** 4.180***
(0.993) (0.910)
Debt (stock) -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -3.234*** -2.090***
(0.475) (0.409)
Observations 3220 3220
Log likelihood -739.910 -903.504
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
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B.2 Balancing test
Table B.2: Balancing test
Merged Year 2004
Variables Treated Control bias t
Dominant merger model
Pop. U 65401 34546 26.70 3.60***
M 65401 54775 9.20 1.01
Area U 132.59 113.88 15.90 1.96**
M 132.59 122.29 8.80 0.87
Pop. 65 U 0.19 0.21 -24.00 -3.10***
M 0.19 0.19 10.10 1.14
Pop. 15 U 0.17 0.16 23.20 2.90***
M 0.17 0.17 -6.30 -0.67
LAT grants U 0.25 0.30 -45.70 -6.23***
M 0.25 0.24 2.80 0.30
Specic grants U 0.09 0.08 35.40 4.80***
M 0.09 0.09 -9.70 -0.89
Debt(Stock) U 475.13 686.64 -49.40 -5.58***
M 475.13 451.35 5.6 1.00
Merged year 2005
Variables Treated Control bias t
Dominant merger model
Pop. U 66844 33566 26.40 4.48***
M 66844 69947 -2.50 -0.17
Area U 146.25 111.99 25.60 4.15***
M 146.25 165.09 -14.10 -1.25
Pop. 65 U 0.18 0.21 -41.70 -6.04***
M 0.18 0.19 -2.20 -0.29
Pop. 15 U 0.17 0.16 24.20 3.71***
M 0.17 0.16 8.00 1
LAT grants U 0.24 0.31 -53.60 -8.44***
M 0.24 0.24 -2.70 -0.32
Specic grants U 0.09 0.08 41.40 6.56***
M 0.09 0.09 -2.60 -0.28
Debt(Stock) U 459.77 693.91 -54.60 -7.13***
M 459.77 482.97 -5.4 -1.11
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively. U shows the unmatched data, and M shows the
matched data after propensity score matching.
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B.3 PSM with DID
Table B.3: PSM with DID
Merged year 2004 Total expenditure Investment Bond
2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002
Dominant merger model
Nearest Neighbor Matching 25.148*** 16.405** 5.667 2.647 -0.722 -3.861
( 9.769 ) ( 8.350 ) ( 5.806 ) ( 5.678 ) ( 3.960 ) ( 4.056 )
On support: Treated 218 218 218 218 218 218
Control 2,503 2,601 2,503 2,595 2,496 2,595
Radius Matching 17.607*** 17.304*** 2.360 3.842 -5.474* -1.586
( 5.212 ) ( 5.117 ) ( 3.859 ) ( 3.790 ) ( 2.890 ) ( 2.865 )
On support: Treated 218 218 218 218 218 218
Control 2,503 2,601 2,503 2,595 2,496 2,595
Kernel Matching 16.213*** 15.567*** 1.765 3.053 -4.175 -1.353
( 5.319 ) ( 5.207 ) ( 3.915 ) ( 3.836 ) ( 2.938 ) ( 2.907 )
On support: Treated 218 218 218 218 218 218
Control 2,503 2,601 2,503 2,595 2,496 2,595
Merged year 2005 Total expenditure Investment Bond
2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003
Dominant merger model
Nearest Neighbor Matching 15.889* 6.476 1.188 -0.022 0.265 -1.494
( 9.535 ) ( 7.815 ) ( 4.775 ) ( 4.901 ) ( 3.971 ) ( 3.981 )
On support: Treated 297 297 297 297 297 297
Control 1,805 2,525 1,805 2,525 1,796 2,516
Radius Matching 16.064*** 1.134 0.641 -2.951 -2.568 -8.148***
( 6.121 ) ( 5.183 ) ( 3.127 ) ( 3.174 ) ( 2.855 ) ( 2.623 )
On support: Treated 297 297 297 297 297 297
Control 1,805 2,525 1,805 2,525 1,796 2,516
Kernel Matching 12.486** -1.351 -0.797 -4.094 -2.886 -6.917**
( 6.321 ) ( 5.361 ) ( 3.261 ) ( 3.289 ) ( 2.932 ) ( 2.709 )
On support: Treated 297 297 297 297 297 297
Control 1,805 2,525 1,805 2,525 1,796 2,516
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 per-
cent level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in brackets. Standard
errors of radius and kernel matching caluclated with the bootstrap method.
We used 100 bootstrap iterations. The r for theradius matching is 0.01, and
the bandwidth for the kernel matching is 0.06.
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